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PC Crane, LLC will be referred to as "PC Crane." Defendants David Belcher, 
Vernon Belcher, and Paul Belcher (all owners of PC Crane) will collectively be referred 
to as "Belchers." Defendants McQueen Masonry, Inc., Central Equipment, LC, McQueen 
Crane Services, LC, and James McQueen will be collectively referred to as "McQueen." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' Brief advanced a Statement of Facts upon which McQueen also relies 
for the cross-appeal. Cross-appellants' Statement of Facts is inaccurate in the following 
respects: 
PC Crane sued to avoid payment under the Goodwill Notes, which allow 
attorney's fees. PC Crane states in Paragraphs A.l and 3 that the parties' "agreements" 
do not provide for attorney's fees. The purchase Agreement(s) prescribed that goodwill/ 
consulting services were to be paid for by attached Promissory Notes, which included 
attorney's fees provisions. [Ex. 2 (see p. 1, fifth "Whereas," and Promissory Note 
attached as Exhibit E); Ex. 7 (see paragraphs 2 and 3 and Promissory Note attached as 
i 
Exhibit A)]. Paragraph A.4 states that PC Crane sued "to recover as damages the 
goodwill payments . . . under the Purchase Agreements." The goodwill "payments," by 
PC Crane's own admission, are the payments required under the $228,800 Note and the 
$177,600 Note (the "Goodwill Notes"). [R. 3,1f 25; R. 6, ffif 33-34]. In suing to recover 
their "damages" for a lack of goodwill, the only relief sought by PC Crane was the
 i 
recovery of all payments made under the Goodwill Notes. PC Crane at trial offered Ex, 
13 to prove the amount of its total "damages" — it sets forth only the amounts paid under 
. - • ' • • < 
the Goodwill Notes. 
• 1 
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The Stipulation deferring default remedies has no application as concerns 
entitlement to attorney's fees for default. At Paragraphs C. 18-25, PC Crane states that 
the parties entered into a Stipulation that deferred the due dates of payments under the 
Notes, which eliminated any default. The Stipulation, given as an accommodation to PC 
Crane, relieved PC Crane of paying the balloon payments under the Notes until this case 
was decided [R. 1514-15, ffif 4, 8] and deferred the exercise of default remedies based 
thereon [R. 1515, *j{ 11]. PC Crane, absent the Stipulation, did not pay either Note timely.1 
PC Crane fails to note that the Stipulation provided that ''nothing contained herein shall 
affect or impair any right that any party may have to recover costs, expenses, or attorney's 
fees from any other party pursuant to the Trust Deed, the $228,800 Note, the $ 177,600 
Note, or any other agreement." [R. 1515, ^ f 11]. As concerns entitlement to attorney's 
fees based on default, therefore, the Stipulation is by its own terms inapplicable. 
McQueen did initiate action to recover their fees. In Section D, PC Crane 
asserts that McQueen did not initiate any "legal action" to recover attorney's fees. 
McQueen asserted the only "legal action" they could — in response to PC Crane's 
Complaint seeking to avoid all liability under the Goodwill Notes, McQueen filed an 
Answer asserting PC Crane's liability under those Notes and, in the prayer of that 
Answer, requested that McQueen "be awarded their costs, expenses, and attorney's fees 
. . . . " [R. 106]. 
^ h e balloon payment under the $177,600 Note was due April 1, 2008 (Ex. 8) and 
was paid August 27, 2008 [R. 3570, «| 36]. The balloon payment under the $228,800 
Note was due October 30, 2007 (Ex. 11) and was paid August 27, 2008 [R. 3569, % 35]. 
2 
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McQueen did not object to being paid; they objected to being forced to release 
their collateral. In Section E, PC Crane suggests that McQueen unreasonably contested 
Judge Dever's Order forcing McQueen to accept payment under the Goodwill Notes. 
Payment was not the problem. PC Crane wanted to free up the property covered by 
McQueen's Trust Deed securing the Goodwill Notes and filed a Motion asking the Court 
to force McQueen to accept payment under the Goodwill Notes and to reconvey its Trust 
Deed. [R. 2165-97]. Judge Dever then entered an Order requiring McQueen to accept 
payment under the Notes and reconvey the Trust Deed securing those Notes. [R. 2757]. 
McQueen objected on the ground that Judge Dever's Order forced McQueen to reconvey 
their Trust Deed, which was also security for attorney's fees yet to be awarded. [R. 
2198]. Judge Dever's Order left McQueen unsecured both with respect to the attorney's 
fees that have already been granted as sanctions and those that this Court may award. 
McQueen did not object to being paid; they objected to being forced to give up the Trust 
Deed's security for attorney's fees, for which they bargained. 
The Goodwill Notes were the subject of this action. PC Crane also asserts in 
Section E that "the Promissory Notes were not the subject of this litigation." ffl E.35]. 
PC Crane sued McQueen to recover all payments made for goodwill (i.e., the payments 
made under the Goodwill Notes).2 Because Judge Dever's Order required McQueen to 
accept payment under the Goodwill Notes and to reconvey their Trust Deed before trial, 
Paragraphs 25 and 34 of its Complaint allege that the Goodwill Notes were the 
payment for goodwill. The Complaint prayed for judgment relieving PC Crane of its 
obligation to pay for goodwill. PC Crane sought no damages other than the payments it 
made under the Goodwill Notes. 
3 
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the issue of non-payment under the Notes was no longer an issue at trial. The Jury found 
PC Crane had performed all of its obligations because Judge Dever had already forced 
McQueen to accept payment under the Notes and to reconvey the security for those Notes. 
What was an issue was whether PC Crane was entitled to recover as damages from 
McQueen all payments made by PC Crane under the Goodwill Notes. On this issue, the 
Jury found that McQueen had not breached their duty to supply goodwill and, as a 
consequence, PC Crane was not entitled to recover all the payments that it made under the 
Goodwill Notes. 
The second purchase Agreement was signed in mid-April, 2005. In Section F, 
Paragraph 41, PC Crane asserts that the second purchase Agreement was "signed" in 
March, 2005 citing R. 2423, which contains no evidence to that effect. Although this 
Agreement is dated in March, 2005, it was executed3 and the transaction closed between 
April 14 and 15, 2005. [R. 1910 (Guaranty executed April 4, 2005); R. 1911-14 (Trust 
Deed executed April 15, 2005); V. Belcher Depo., R. 1899, pp. 23-25; D. Belcher Depo., 
R. 1902-03, pp. 70-71 (all closing documents signed together)]. 
The trailer issue. In Sections G and H (Appellees' Brief, pp. 13-15), PC Crane 
argues that the "Fontaine trailer," which was admittedly the only trailer PC Crane ever 
modified, was not the trailer on which PC Crane and Stam collaborated. First, the facts 
3The date the parties executed the second purchase Agreement documents is 
significant because Stam and Belchers had extensive communications prior to the signing 
of these documents. PC Crane and Belchers claimed they executed the documents for the 
second purchase transaction without knowing of Stam's involvement in McQueen's 
business and without ever having had any substantive communication with Stam. 
4 
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establish that the Fontaine trailer was in fact4 the one to which reference was made in the 
documents given to Bank of American Fork (this document is in McQueen's Addendum 
at pp. 18-26 [the "Bank Disclosure"]). Second, and this is the important point, even if, 
against all the evidence5, the Fontaine trailer was not the one referred to in the Bank 
Disclosure, the problem is that PC Crane and its counsel over an eight-month period 
falsely stated again and again that there were two modified trailers, and there was a 
modified trailer on which Stam and Belchers collaborated, which was built in 2006. In 
Section I, Paragraphs 59-62, PC Crane advances an extraordinarily incomplete 
description of its responses and communications concerning the trailer, and then 
concludes in Paragraph 1.62 that these facts "support the statements of Mr. Burghardt at 
the September 5, 2007 hearing that the 'collaboration' was in 2006 . . . ." — the 
implication being that Burghardt told the Court that there was only "collaboration," not 
construction of a trailer.6 This Burghardt quotation is incomplete. He represented to the 
Court that the subject trailer and collaboration occurred after the end of 2005.7 PC 
4
 Appellants' Brief at pp. 21-22 explains why this is so. 
5To assume that the Fontaine trailer was not the trailer on which collaboration 
occurred, one must (i) conclude that PC Crane in the Bank Disclosure falsely stated that 
such a trailer was created and in fact increased PC Crane's revenues, and (ii) conclude 
that all of the statements of PC Crane and its counsel over an eight-month period to the 
effect that there was a trailer on which Stam and PC Crane collaborated were also false. 
See also id. 
6PC Crane's counsel indicated on multiple occasions to the Court and McQueen's 
counsel that there was collaboration on a trailer that was modified and existed. 
[Appellants' Brief, pp. 13-21; 35-38]. 
7The full quote appears in Appellants'Brief at p. 15. [R. 4001; T. 50-52]. 
5 
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Crane's Brief makes no effort to justify or explain the litany of other false statements by 
PC Crane's counsel to the Court and McQueen's counsel over an eight-month period — 
all to the effect that there were two modified trailers and that there was a trailer on which 
Stam and Belchers collaborated which was created in 2006 - at an irrelevant time. 
The trailer was important at trial. Section J, Paragraphs 63-65, suggest that the 
trailer issue was unimportant at trial, an issue seemingly irrelevant to whether PC Crane 
should be sanctioned for misrepresenting facts and hiding evidence. In fact, the trailer 
issue was absolutely critical at trial.8 
Findings regarding sanctions. In Section K, PC Crane suggests that the District 
Court made essentially no findings to support the award of sanctions. The District 
Court's Memorandum Decision [R. 3913-14] found that PC Crane's counsel represented 
both to the Court and to McQueen's counsel that Stam and PC Crane "had collaborated 
on a custom-designed trailer" and that PC Crane "had built a different trailer for a 
different crane that was not the subject of [McQueen's] discovery requests." The District 
Court found that at a later date, "Plaintiffs' counsel represented to Defense Counsel that 
the trailer at issue was never built and that no documents existed." The District Court 
then stated, "The Court finds that Plaintiffs' [PC Crane's] position on March 26, 2008, 
8McQueen introduced the Bank Disclosure [Ex. 61], documents establishing that 
the trailer was acquired and modified in the period between March 9, 2005 and April 8, 
2005 [Exs. 85, 86], and Belchers' testimony that the only trailer modified was the 
Fontaine, which was modified before the second Agreement with McQueen. This 
evidence established that Stam and Belchers were communicating and collaborating on a 
trailer at a time when they said they didn't know each other. The Jury evidently believed 
this evidence. 
6 
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that the trailer had never been built, was inconsistent with Plaintiffs' previous position 
that the trailer had existed . . . . Based on the inconsistency of Plaintiffs' position, the 
Court holds that sanctions are appropriate on the Second Motion for Sanctions." Thus, 
the District Court found that prior to the March 26, 2008 hearing, PC Crane maintained 
both to the Court and to McQueen's counsel that Stam and PC Crane did collaborate on a 
modified trailer, which existed, and that, after that hearing (at which the Court required 
PC Crane to make disclosures that would demonstrate its prior position to be false), PC 
Crane took the position that no such trailer ever existed. The Court's ruling, and the 
uncontested record before this Court, establish that over eight months PC Crane and its 
counsel misled both the Court and McQueen's counsel on this account. The District 
Court's finding that the positions were "inconsistent" is a finding that one or the other 
position was false. 
ARGUMENT 
1 THE AWARD OF SANCTIONS SHOULD STAND AND BE AUGMENTED. 
PC Crane notes that McQueen's Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for 
Sanctions is not in the record. It is there, albeit seemingly out of order, at R. 2259. 
A- PC Crane Does Not Contest the Material Facts. 
Appellants' Brief contains a comprehensive description of what happened here, 
meticulously supported by citations to the Record. PC Crane challenges none of those 
facts. Those undisputed facts, as the District Court found, establish that over an extensive 
period, PC Crane and its counsel misrepresented both to the Court and McQueen's 
counsel in letters, discovery responses, and open court that there in fact existed a second 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trailer referred to in the Bank Disclosure that was constructed after the second crane 
purchase Agreement executed in April, 2005. PC Crane's counsel argued that they 
should not be required to supply discovery on this second modified trailer because it was 
built after December, 2005 and was, therefore, not relevant. Only after the District Court 
ordered further disclosures that would demonstrate the falsity of their statements did PC 
Crane diametrically change its position to the position that there was only one modified 
trailer and that no trailer modified in collaboration with Stam ever existed.9 
B. Standard of Review. 
PC Crane asserts that the standard of review for the Court's decision to award 
discovery sanctions is correction of error. This issue, as well as the amount of the 
sanctions award are not entitled to deference because Judge Reese did not preside over 
this action during the discovery abuse in question; he, like this Court will, decided the 
Motion based upon the record only. Under such circumstances, the District Court's 
decision is not entitled to the usual deference. West Valley City v. Young, 2001 UT App. 
216 [unpublished]10 ("[W]e do not defer to the trial court's factual findings because Judge 
Maughan, who ruled on the motion for a new trial, did not preside at defendant's trial. 
Judge Maughan relied on the trial court record, and thus we review the evidence 
presented without deference to the trial court's findings."); State v. Moore, 2009 UT App. 
9This position, also, is diametrically opposed to PC Crane's statement in the Bank 
Disclosure that such a trailer was in fact built and that its existence resulted in a "dramatic 
increase" in the annual revenue of the 300-ton crane. 
10A copy of this case is attached. 
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128, TJ 5, 210 P.3d 967 (no deference given to trial court's decision "since it was a review 
of the record, which this court is just as capable of reviewing as the district court"). 
C. The District Court Properly Awarded Sanctions. 
In Point III.A, PC Crane argues that the District Court's findings were legally 
insufficient to sustain a sanction award. The only case cited by PC Crane which 
addresses the findings required by the District Court in this regard is Kilpatrick v. 
Bullough Abatement, Inc., 2008 UT 82, 199 P.3d 957, which set forth the following 
framework for analysis of sanctions on appeal: 
Our review of a District Court's imposition of sanctions 
follows a two-step process. First, we ensure that the District Court 
has made a factual finding that the party's behavior merits sanctions. 
Second, once the factual finding has been made, we will only disturb 
the sanction if "abuse of discretion [is] clearly shown." Id. at f^ 23. 
Those two prongs of the Court's analysis will now be addressed. Judge Reese's Ruling 
recited that PC Crane's counsel made multiple representations to the District Court and 
McQueen's counsel that there existed a different trailer for a different crane that was 
outside the scope of discovery and that, after the Court's discovery Order of March 20, 
2008, PC Crane's counsel took the position that the trailer at issue was never built. One 
or the other of the "inconsistent" positions was necessarily false. The Court's ruling then 
found, based upon the inconsistency of PC Crane's positions "that sanctions are 
appropriate on the Second Motion for Sanctions." The District Court therefore made a
 y 
"factual finding that the party's behavior merits sanctions" as required by Kilpatrick, 
The second prong of the analysis requires a determination whether the District 
Court abused its discretion. The Court stated: 
9 
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Sanctions are warranted when "(1) the party's behavior was 
willful; (2) the party has acted in bad faith; (3) the Court can 
attribute some fault to the party; or (4) the party has engaged in 
persistent dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the judicial process." 
[Kilpatrick at «[f 2 5 ]. 
The Kilpatrick Court stated that a failure to make specific factual findings regarding these 
specific grounds is not necessary. The Court stated: 
In Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schettler, the Court of Appeals 
held that the District Court's failure to make a specific finding of 
willfulness, bad faith or fault "is not grounds for reversal if 'a full 
understanding of the issues on appeal can nevertheless be determined 
by the appellate court."' In Schettler, the Court of Appeals upheld 
the District Court's dismissal of the case despite the absence of a 
finding of willfulness where the record "clearly demonstrate[d] a 
pattern of aggravated misconduct in the form of willful and 
deliberate disobedience of discovery orders, fabricated testimony, 
and attempted witness tampering." 
The District Court's finding of sanctionable behavior is sustainable on either of two 
grounds: First, the Court in its ruling adequately stated the basis for the sanction. Even 
though the ruling did not use the exact words "willful" or "bad faith" or "fault" or 
"persistent dilatory tactics," it is self-evident that a party's behavior is "willful," "in bad 
faith," and "fault" can be attributed to the party when a party over an eight-month period 
says one thing and refuses to provide discovery because the trailer exists but was 
manufactured at an irrelevant time but when forced to disclose documents that would 
reveal the falsity of that statement changes its position to the non-existence of any such 
trailer. Second, as in the Schettler case quoted in Kilpatrick, an absence of specific 
findings of willfulness, bad faith, or fault is not grounds for reversal if a full 
understanding of the issues on appeal can be determined by the Appellate Court. That is 
10 
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surely the case here. 
Utah's Appellate Courts recognize that a wide range of behaviors warrant 
sanctions.11 PC Crane's behavior involved discovery responses and objections advancing 
and based on a false position and oral and written statements to the Court and McQueen's 
counsel conveying false information to avoid discovery of the facts. The Courts have 
been intolerant of such behavior. 
In Fox v. Studebaker-Worthington, Inc., 516 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1975), the Eighth 
Circuit examined facts very similar to ours. Plaintiff originally testified in a deposition 
that he had tapes of "bugged" conversations, but that he had destroyed all of the tapes. 
516 F.2d at 991. He subsequently testified that some of the tapes were not destroyed and 
that he had them in his possession. In a subsequent deposition, the plaintiff testified that 
he had never bugged any conversations and that no tapes ever existed. The trial court 
dismissed all three plaintiffs' complaints pursuant to Rule 37(d) because of the "shocking 
abuse12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing the discovery process." Id. 
The circuit court upheld the dismissal. Other courts have adopted the same level of 
intolerance. Sandoval v. Martinez, 780 P.2d 1152 (NM Ct. App. 1989) [Complaint 
dismissed because of plaintiff s dishonest and misleading discovery responses. Court 
uGorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, 17 P.3d 1110 [tactics that frustrate the 
judicial process trigger Rule 37 sanctions]; Coxey v. Oldroyd, 2005 UT App. 185, 112 
P.3d 1244 [sanctions appropriate for disregarding discovery obligations even absent a 
court order compelling discovery]; Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 UT App. 75, 999 P.2d 588 
[discovery sanctions appropriate for late or incomplete responses; there need not be a 
complete failure to respond], 
12The abuse there pales in comparison to what happened here. 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
held dishonest responses amount to but are worse than a total failure to respond]; 
Archibeque v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 70 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 1995) 
[Complaint dismissed because plaintiff gave false and misleading discovery responses]; 
Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 899 P.2d 594 (NM 1995) [Discovery sanctions of $150,000 
upheld for false answers to interrogatories and withholding of information], PC Crane's 
behavior was gross, involved multiple events of dishonesty over an extended period, and 
warrants sanctions. 
D. PC Crane's Behavior Was Neither Innocent Nor Justifiable. 
At pages 33-36 of its Brief, PC Crane argues that its behavior was innocent. PC 
Crane makes no effort to dispute the mountain of contrary facts set forth in Appellants' 
Brief. Instead, PC Crane states (i) the Fontaine trailer and the trailer referred to in the 
Bank Disclosure were not the same trailer, and (ii) PC Crane's counsel's "mistake" was 
innocent. 
As to the first point, whether or not the trailer referred to in the Bank Disclosure 
document was the same as the modified Fontaine trailer is irrelevant to this issue. What is 
relevant is that for eight months PC Crane and its counsel stated again and again that 
there were two trailers and that the one referred to in the Bank Disclosure was 
collaborated upon and constructed after the second crane transaction closed. So long as 
PC Crane could continue credibly to assert that there was in fact a second modified trailer 
on which Stam and Belchers collaborated in 2006, PC Crane could continue to argue that 
they knew nothing about Stam until after the second crane transaction. When forced by 
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the Court, PC Crane was required to admit that there was only one trailer and to assert 
that the second trailer (which they represented had been modified in 2006) never existed. 
Whether or not the Fontaine trailer was the one referred to in the Bank Disclosure13 
doesn't matter. What does matter is that PC Crane's counsel for eight months misled the 
Court and McQueen by stating on multiple occasions that there were two trailers and that 
the one referred to in the Bank Disclosure was in fact collaborated upon and constructed 
long after the second crane transaction closed — facts that are admittedly false. 
With respect to the second point, the "innocent mistake" argument, McQueen 
refers the Court to Appellants' Brief, which catalogues the litany of misleading discovery 
responses, outright false statements, and evasive maneuvering, none of which PC Crane 
denies. For an eight-month period, McQueen through the discovery process pounded and 
pounded on PC Crane in an effort to determine the absolutely critical date on which the 
trailer identified in the Bank Disclosure document was modified. McQueen's counsel on 
December 7, 2007, in the middle of PC Crane's eight month period of obfuscation, 
advised PC Crane's counsel in writing of the seriousness of their behavior: 
We intend to seek sanctions if the documents relating to this trailer 
and the answer to Interrogatory No. 4 are not immediately 
forthcoming. When we do, and when this matter plays out, we do 
not want you or your client to be able to say that there was some 
innocent mistake made. You and your client are on notice that the 
trailer in question was made and titled during the time period for 
I3It should not be lost on anyone that PC Crane's latest position that the only 
modified trailer was not the modified trailer referred to in the Bank Disclosure renders 
absolutely false PC Crane's pre-litigation written statement in the Bank Disclosure that 
such a trailer existed and enhanced revenues. The PC Crane principals who wrote the 
Bank Disclosure surely knew the true facts. 
13 
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which production was ordered by the Court. If these documents are 
not produced now, in response to this very pointed request, it 
will be clear that they have been intentionally withheld. 
PC Crane thereafter continued to assert the false position that there were two trailers and 
that the collaborated trailer was modified after 2005, at an irrelevant time — both lies. PC 
Crane's counsel recognized that McQueen was claiming that PC Crane was "lying" about 
the trailer. Mr. Barneck told the Court at the March 4, 2008 hearing that McQueen's 
efforts were "a witch hunt" based on "unfounded suspicions that we have been hiding or 
destroying documents or lying." [R. 4002; T. 75]. Normal people, when aware that their 
veracity is questioned, make certain of the truthfulness of their statements or concede 
their inaccuracy and apologize. At the very same hearing, Barneck again repeated to the 
Court the false facts that there were two modified trailers and that the Fontaine trailer was 
not the one referred to in the Bank Disclosure. [R. 4002; T. 39, 75]. 
PC Crane's assertion of an "innocent" mistake is also belied by the following: 
L PC Crane's counsel's statement that there were two modified trailers was 
admittedly false. Either their statement that the collaborated trailer was never constructed 
or their statement that it was in fact constructed after December, 2005 was necessarily 
false. 
2. The pre-litigation Bank Disclosure plainly stated that there was a modified 
trailer on which Stam and Belchers collaborated. If PC Crane had stated initially that no 
such trailer existed, its statement in the Bank Disclosure would thereby be shown to be 
false and problematic (especially since the only trailer that PC Crane modified was 
constructed before the second crane Agreement). 
14 
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3. PC Crane, on August 7, 2007 and again on November 14, 2007, objected to 
discovery requesting information about the collaborated modified trailer on the grounds 
that the requests were "overly broad, unduly burdensome, and . . . not relevant." [R. 947; 
1555]. Rule 26(g), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that counsel certified that 
those objections were warranted. Before making them, PC Crane's counsel was required 
to inquire about whether the modified trailer existed, where it was built, etc. The 
objection was baseless if no such trailer existed. Either PC Crane's counsel violated Rule 
26{g) or filed a knowing false objection. 
4. McQueen's counsel sought informally to resolve this discovery dispute. PC 
Crane's counsel insisted on not responding as to any period after April, 2005. [R. 2281, 
2284]. No credible reason exists for such a restriction other than to preserve the right to 
claim that there was a collaborated trailer, but it was modified after April, 2005 — a 
falsehood. 
5. Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that an attorney's 
signature on any paper certifies "after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances" that 
all factual assertions are supported. PC Crane's attorneys filed multiple papers with the 
Court that stated, or were necessarily based upon the facts that (i) there were two trailers 
and (ii) the collaborated trailer was constructed after April 2005 (BOTH FALSE). E.g., 
R. 994, 997-98; R, 1633-34, ffif 37-38. PC Crane cannot credibly claim that it made no 
inquiry to determine the accuracy of these factual representations. Either PC Crane's 
counsel violated Rule 11 or filed knowingly false statements. 
6. PC Crane's counsel stated repeatedly that there were two modified trailers 
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and that the collaborated trailer was built after 2005. Alleged confusion about whether 
the collaborated trailer was built at all cannot explain the affirmative false statements (i) 
that the collaborated trailer was built after December 2005 and (ii) that there were two 
modified trailers. 
7. PC Crane's counsel on at least nine separate occasions gave the Court and 
McQueen's counsel false, misleading statements. Appellants' Brief, pp. 35-38. 
8. PC Crane's counsel made repeated false and misleading statements over an 
eight month period. It is not credible that on request after request, and motion after 
motion, over eight months, PC Crane remained confused. 
9. Both Mr. Barneck and Mr. Burghardt made the same multiple false 
statements. It is not credible that both were confused in exactly the same way. 
10. The false statements by Messrs. Barneck and Burghardt are consistent with 
the same false theme articulated by their clients, Belchers, who testified that they did not 
know who Stam was and that Stam's involvement was concealed from them by McQueen 
prior to the second crane transaction — when Belchers and Stam had over eighty 
documented cell phone calls within the three-plus months before the closing of the second 
crane transaction. [Appellants'Brief, pp. 7-9]. 
11. Just 6 days after the Court ordered disclosure of information that would 
prove false their prior statements about two trailers and a post-2005 collaborated trailer, 
PC Crane's counsel changed their position to state that there was no collaborated trailer. 
This was obviously no coincidence. 
12. The only credible, logical explanation for this behavior was that PC Crane 
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desired to keep from McQueen the damning facts that there was only one modified trailer, 
that it fit the description of the trailer described in the Bank Disclosure, and that this 
trailer was modified before the second transaction. 
PC Crane's Brief suggests that McQueen's characterization of its behavior in stark 
terms is inappropriate. As noted in McQueen's Appellants' Brief, McQueen is aware that 
Courts generally disfavor the use of such strong language. Here, however, the language 
is accurate and gentle terms do not describe PC Crane's behavior.14 If McQueen had not 
forcefully pursued the truth, they could have lost this case based upon dishonesty and 
perversion of the legal process. 
E. The Sanctions Award Should be Augmented. 
PC Crane alternatively argues that the District Court's award of sanctions should 
be affirmed because (i) the District Court's award should be accorded deference by this 
Court and (ii) PC Crane's misconduct was inconsequential. 
McQueen's opening Brief argued that this Court should not give significant 
deference to the Trial Court's conclusions because Judge Reese did not preside over PC 
Crane's discovery abuse — Judge Reese, like this Court will, reviewed it only on the 
record. As noted above at pp. 8-9, this Court holds that when an Appellate Court reviews 
a District Court decision that was itself based exclusively on the record, the Appellate 
Court gives no deference to the District Court's decision. 
14Every claim that PC Crane stated falsehoods, "lies," and/or "misleading 
statements" is supported by the record. PC Crane makes no effort to demonstrate that any 
of their false statements were truthful. 
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With respect to the appropriate magnitude of the sanction award, McQueen relies 
on Appellants' Brief, to which PC Crane offered no substantive response. 
ii. MCQUEEN SHOULD RECOVER ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN 
DEFENDING AGAINST PC CRANE'S CLAIMS. 
A. McQueen is Entitled to Recover Attorney's Fees Under Section 
78B-5-826. 
McQueen was entitled to recover its attorney's fees, under Hooban v. Unicity 
International, Inc., 2009 UT App. 287, cert, granted, 225 P.3d 880 (UT 2010), because 
both elements articulated in that case for recovery were satisfied. PC Crane does not 
question that fact, but asserts that this argument was not timely presented below. The 
argument was not presented below because the Hooban case was not decided until after 
the District Court made the subject Ruling on April 16, 2009. The apparent principle 
underpinning Hooban is that it is unfair for one party to seek to recover attorney's fees 
claiming a contract allows an award (whether based on the contract or Section 78B-5-
826) and then, if it loses, escape such liability by inconsistently claiming that the contract 
does not allow such an award. That is exactly what happened here. 
B. McQueen is Entitled to Recover Legal Fees Under the Goodwill Notes, 
PC Crane filed this action seeking to extinguish or rescind its obligations under the 
Goodwill Notes. The Goodwill Notes provided that in the event of any default (defined 
to include a failure to make payments), McQueen was entitled to recover their attorney's 
fees in any collection action. PC Crane argues that because it made the payments under 
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the Notes15, there was no "default" and the attorney's fees provisions are inapplicable. 
PC Crane seemingly concedes that if it had failed to make a payment and McQueen had 
sought to enforce their right to payment, attorney's fees would be recoverable. PC Crane 
argues, however, that because PC Crane sued McQueen to avoid making future payments 
and to recover payments already made, the recoverability of attorney's fees is different. It 
is undisputed that PC Crane sued McQueen to escape liability under the Goodwill Notes 
and that McQueen in their Answer sought enforcement of the Goodwill Notes and 
recovery of their attorney's fees. Whether or not there were tardy payment(s) under the 
Goodwill Notes, McQueen is entitled to recover their attorney's fees. 
The treatment of a contractual provision allowing recovery of fees in a suit to 
enforce a contract when a party files a preemptory action to avoid enforcement of the 
contract was addressed in Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App. 404, 38 P.3d 1001, addressed in 
Appellants' Brief at 45, et seq. PC Crane seeks to distinguish this dispositive case in less 
than one page of its Brief [Appellees' Brief at p. 29]. Chase and our case are logically 
indistinguishable: In both cases, plaintiff sued to rescind16 a contract allowing recovery 
of attorney's fees in an action to enforce the contract. In both cases, the plaintiff argued 
l5PC Crane claims it timely made its payments (which were admittedly not timely 
under the Goodwill Notes themselves) based upon a Stipulation between it and McQueen 
providing that McQueen would not pursue any default remedy based upon PC Crane's 
admittedly tardy payments. As noted above, at p. 2, the Stipulation itself provided that 
nothing contained in it would alter McQueen's right to recover attorney's fees under the 
Notes. 
16PC Crane's Complaint explicitly prayed for judgment "rescinding" the 
Agreements and sought rescissional damages — recovery of all amounts paid and relief 
from future payments to be paid under the Goodwill Notes. 
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that the defendant's defense to the rescission claim was not a claim to enforce the contract 
as the fee provision required, but rather a defense to a rescission claim. In both cases, 
defendant argued that its defense of plaintiff s action to rescind was in effect an action to 
enforce the contract. In both cases, plaintiff claimed that there was no liability for the 
fees because it had fully performed its contractual obligations. The Court in Chase 
allowed recovery of attorney's fees under a provision permitting them in "litigation to 
enforce" the contract. Here, the Goodwill Notes allow recovery of attorney's fees in an 
action to collect the Notes in the event of a default. In Chase, plaintiff argued that the 
contract language allowing fees "to enforce" the contract was not applicable because 
there was nothing to enforce — it had fully performed. Here, PC Crane argues that 
because it fully paid (fully performed) under the Goodwill Notes, there was no default 
and McQueen did not pursue an action to enforce the Notes. In both cases, the plaintiffs' 
effort to rescind the agreements had the same effect (of seeking to escape its obligations) 
as a failure to perform. The logic of the Chase decision compels the same result here. 
C. The Goodwill Notes' Attorney's Fee Provisions Apply Here. 
PC Crane asserts at pp. 25-26 of its Brief that because this action was under the 
purchase Agreements, not the Goodwill Notes, no attorney's fees are recoverable. As 
already noted, the purchase Agreements provided that McQueen was to supply goodwill 
and that PC Crane was to pay for that goodwill with the Goodwill Note(s). [See p. 1 
above]. PC Crane's suit to "rescind" these obligations, to recover all payments made 
under the Goodwill Notes, and to be relieved of future payments under the Goodwill 
Notes clearly implicate the attorney's fee provisions of the Goodwill Notes themselves. 
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D. The Trust Deed Mandates Recovery of Legal Expenses, 
PC Crane gave McQueen Goodwill Notes secured by a Trust Deed. For two 
reasons, the Trust Deed mandates an award of attorney's fees here. First, PC Crane sued 
to rescind and extinguish the entire debt secured by that Trust Deed (which necessarily 
would extinguish the Trust Deed itself). PC Crane argues that because the District Court 
found that PC Crane did not fail to make a payment under the Goodwill Notes17, this 
provision does not apply. That is not the point - the point is that PC Crane sued 
McQueen to extinguish all of the obligations secured by the Trust Deed (and hence the 
Trust Deed itself), which implicated the Trust Deed's provisions entitling McQueen to 
defend any action which "affect[ed] the security [of the Trust Deed] or the rights . . . of 
[McQueen]." PC Crane's argument as to the second prong of the Trust Deed's attorney's 
fees provision is that because McQueen was unsuccessful in attempting to avoid being 
forced to reconvey the Trust Deed, no attorney's fees should be awarded in that effort. 
Judge Dever, at PC Crane's request, entered an Order requiring McQueen to accept 
payment of the Goodwill Notes and forcing McQueen to reconvey the Trust Deed over 
McQueen's objection that the Trust Deed still secured attorney's fees and could not 
properly yet be reconveyed. The Trust Deed's provisions permit recovery of attorney's 
fees in defending against any effort to affect that Trust Deed. The Trust Deed 
17PC Crane sued to extinguish its debt under both Goodwill Notes long before they 
were either due or paid. 
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necessarily18 does not require that McQueen prevail in those efforts. Either of the two 
grounds noted above independently justifies an award of fees here. 
E. The Guarantors are Liable for Attorney's Fees. 
PC Crane asserts that the Guaranty gives rise to attorney's fees liability only if 
"there is a default on the underlying instrument." Id. The Guaranty [Ex. 59; Addendum 
at p. 15] does not so provide. As set forth in Appellants' Brief at page 48, the Guaranty's 
provision for the recovery of attorney's fees is much broader than those of the Goodwill 
Notes and applies in this case. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT'S COST AWARD SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The parties agree on the rule applicable to the recovery of deposition expenses as 
costs: 
The general rule regarding the recovery of deposition costs is 
that a party may recover deposition costs as long as the "trial court is 
persuaded that [the depositions] were taken in good faith and, in 
light of the circumstances, appear to be essential for the development 
and presentation of the case." Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, «| 6. 
PC Crane objects to the award of costs for the following depositions: 
Kelly Banyard. First, Ms. Banyard was the accountant for both PC Crane and 
McQueen and was a critical trial witness. The deposition of Banyard was essential to 
present McQueen's case ~ and Banyard would obviously not, absent subpoena and 
18Trust Deeds typically contain such provisions, the plain basis for them being that 
if anyone or anything challenges the security of a Trust Deed, the creditor should be 
entitled to defend against that challenge without eroding the secured debt by the 
expenditure of attorney's fees. To serve that purpose, fees must be recoverable whether 
or not the effort is successful. 
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deposition, have shared with McQueen relevant documents and information about her 
other client, PC Crane. PC Crane utilized her deposition (referred to therein as Ex. 7) in 
their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of May 17, 2007. [R. 366]. It is difficult to 
understand why PC Crane deemed the deposition necessary (and used it) but asserts that 
McQueen had no such need. 
Jason K. Nelsen. Nelsen was the attorney that represented PC Crane in its 
negotiations with McQueen. PC Crane's Complaint alleged that McQueen's attorney 
prepared documents that materially changed the terms of the parties' agreement, PC 
Crane had no input into the documents, and McQueen misled PC Crane about the 
documents. [Complaint ^ 82, 95, 108; R. 1]. As it turns out, it was PC Crane's attorney, 
Nelsen (not McQueen's attorney), who drafted the very provisions in the documents of 
which PC Crane complained. McQueen filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
[R. 664], which extensively relied upon the Nelsen deposition. See particularly, R. 671-
673. The Court granted McQueen's Motion. [R. 3954]. The deposition of Nelsen was 
essential to McQueen's presentation of and prevailing on its Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, which resulted in the dismissal of three Counts of PC Crane's Complaint. 
Courtney Belcher. Courtney Belcher was Belchers' office manager. Belchers and 
Stam all testified that there was a written commission agreement between them. Although 
twice ordered by the Court to produce it, Belchers claimed they could not find this critical 
document. It was necessary to depose Ms. Belcher to pursue the location of the critical 
commission agreement. At her deposition, she testified she had never done a search of 
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her computer for documents relevant to this lawsuit, that no one ever told her not to delete 
from her computer records that relate to this lawsuit, and that she "deletes documents all 
the time." This information from Ms. Belcher's deposition was used to support 
McQueen's first Motion to Compel. [R. 832 — Courtney Belcher Depo. cited at 844, et 
seq.]. Clearly, when a party allegedly "can't find" absolutely critical documents that 
plainly exist, it is necessary to pursue discovery of its document custodian to determine 
the steps taken to locate the documents. That Motion resulted in the Court's entering an 
Order requiring that PC Crane's computers be inspected to search for outstanding 
discovery requests. [R. 1098, ^ 3 ] . 
Second Depositions of P. Belcher, D. Belcher, V. Belcher, and L. Stam. These 
depositions were all taken in connection with the trailer modification issue. The District 
Court granted McQueen's Third Motion to Compel on March 20, 2008 and allowed 
McQueen to depose the Belchers and Stam on the trailer issue. [R. 2081-2083, <[ 4.b]. 
After the Court entered that Order, PC Crane changed its position to the assertion that the 
collaborated trailer was never built. The second round of depositions were essential to 
and an integral part of the briefing for McQueen's Second Motion for Sanctions, which 
was granted by the District Court. [See Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for 
Sanctions, R. 2259, et seq., to which P. Belcher's deposition is attached at R. 2336, D. 
Belcher's at 2341, V. Belcher's at 2345, and Stam's at 2354]. If McQueen had not 
invested the tens of thousands of dollars in legal fees doggedly pursuing these issues, they 
would never have uncovered one of the most critical facts presented to the Jury in this 
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case — that Stam and Belchers in fact collaborated on modifying a trailer before they 
claimed to know each other. 
Each of the depositions were found by the District Court to be properly taxable. 
Based upon the facts as outlined above, there is no abuse of discretion in these 
determinations. 
CONCLUSION 
As concerns the Cross-Appeal, McQueen requests the following relief: 
1. Affirm the District Court's determination that sanctions are appropriate. 
2. Affirm the District Court's award of costs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z day of July, 2010. 
Maak, Of Counsel 
BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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Delano S. Findlay, Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
J. Richard Catten, West Valley City, for appellee. 
Before GREENWOOD, JACKSON, and ORME, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
GREENWOOD. 
*1 Defendant Cindy Young appeals her convictions 
of assault of a peace officer, a Class A misdemean-
or, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 
(1999), and failure to register her vehicle, a Class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. & 
sect; 41-la-201 (1998). Defendant appeals the jury 
verdict, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel 
and arguing the trial court erred in denying her mo-
tion for a new trial based on the same grounds. We 
affirm. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 
104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984), the Supreme Court 
adopted a two prong test to determine whether 
counsel failed to render adequate legal assistance. 
Under Strickland, "a defendant must show (1) that 
counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the 
performance prejudiced the defense." State v. Clas-
son, 935 P.2d 524, 531 (Utah Ct.App .1997). A trial 
court is required to follow Strickland when ruling 
on a motion for new trial based on ineffective as-
sistance of counsel. See State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
182, 185-86 (Utah 1990). Further, "where a trial 
court has previously heard a motion based on inef-
fective assistance of counsel, reviewing courts are 
free to make an independent determination of a trial 
court's conclusions. The factual findings of the trial 
court, however, shall not be set aside on appeal un-
less clearly erroneous." Id. at 186 (footnote omit-
ted). Normally, such deference is granted because 
the trial court observed the trial and is in an advant-
aged position to assess defense counsel's perform-
ance. 
In the present case, however, we do not defer to the 
trial court's factual findings because Judge 
Maughan, who ruled on the motion for a new trial, 
did not preside at defendant's trial. Judge Maughan 
relied on the trial court record, and thus we review 
the evidence presented without deference to the tri-
al court's findings. See Davis County v. Clearfield 
City, 756 P.2d 704, 710 (Utah Ct .App. 1988) 
("[I]nsofar as the trial court's decision turns on the 
administrative record, we give no particular defer-
ence to the trial court."). FN1 
FN1. As this case demonstrates, it is prob-
lematic for a judge to hear a motion for 
new trial when another judge presided over 
the trial. The trial judge has the advantage 
of listening to witnesses, evaluating their 
demeanor, and observing the performance 
of counsel. Through this first-hand know-
ledge, the trial judge can consider motions 
for a new trial in light of his or her experi-
ence during trial and make reasoned de-
terminations whether a new trial is appro-
priate. Thus, when possible, a judge who 
presides over the trial should also hear and 
decide a motion for new trial. 
In this case, the second Strickland prong is disposit-
ive, and we need not address trial counsel's per-
formance. To satisfy the second prong, "defendant 
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must show that a 'reasonable probability' exists 
that the trial result would have been different if 
counsel had not erred." Classon, 935 P.2d at 532 
(citation omitted). This prong is not satisfied be-
cause the evidence defendant argues should have 
been presented does not create a reasonable probab-
ility of a different result. 
A significant portion of the evidence defendant de-
scribes relates only to events occurring after the as-
sault. Defendant argues that additional evidence 
about the effects of pepper spray would have 
demonstrated that she involuntarily fought against 
the officers as they attempted to place her in hand-
cuffs. The assault charges, however, were based on 
defendant kicking and scratching Officer Lozano 
prior to being sprayed, and thus the pepper spraying 
does not affect the evidence supporting defendant's 
conviction for assault. Further, the officers testified 
concerning the effects of pepper spray and trial 
counsel argued these effects to the jury. 
*2 Similarly, many of the witnesses defendant ar-
gues should have testified arrived at the scene after 
the assault occurred and thus could not have testi-
fied regarding the assault. Defendant argues these 
witnesses would have testified that she was not sit-
ting as the officers claimed, but that she was kneel-
ing. She argues this evidence would have shown the 
officers did not truthfully recount the incident. 
However, the witness who testified on defendant's 
behalf also disagreed with her and the officers as to 
defendant's position after the arrest. Thus, there is 
not a reasonable probability this additional evid-
ence would have affected the jury's decision. 
Defendant argues that the EMT who arrived on the 
scene and additional medical testimony would have 
demonstrated that Officer Lozano was not injured 
by defendant. The testimony at trial indicated that 
defendant kicked and scratched Officer Lozano. 
Lozano and the other officers testified that Lozano 
was bleeding from her hand, but another officer 
testified that he saw no blood. An examination of 
the affidavits and relevant testimony reveals that an 
injury did occur to Officer Lozano, though poten-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No 
Page 2 
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tially less severe than that described by one wit-
ness. However, even if the injury was not as severe 
as one officer testified during trial, the undisputed 
evidence shows that an injury did occur. Addition-
ally, defendant's conviction did not require testi-
mony of a specific injury. The testimony that de-
fendant kicked and scratched Lozano sufficiently 
supports the assault conviction. 
Defendant next argues trial counsel's failure to sug-
gest she plead guilty to the charge of expired regis-
tration forced her to defend this charge without a 
viable defense, causing defendant to lose credibility 
with the jury. However, the State would have 
presented the bulk of the same evidence to show 
why Lozano attempted to impound defendant's 
vehicle. It was defendant's resistance to Lozano's 
attempt to impound the vehicle that led to the as-
sault. Therefore, failure to plead guilty to the ex-
pired registration charge did not prejudice defend-
ant. 
Defendant finally argues that her trial counsel 
should have introduced evidence that Officer Loz-
ano acted in an over-aggressive manner because she 
believed defendant was violating a protective order 
at the time of the incident. However, this argument 
is too speculative to undermine our confidence in 
the jury's decision. See State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 
1250, 1254 (Utah 1993) ("[P]roof of counsel's inef-
fectiveness must be a demonstrable reality, not 
mere speculation."). 
In sum, the evidence that defendant argues her trial 
counsel should have presented does not create a 
reasonable probability of a different outcome at her 
trial for assault of a peace officer. Additionally, de-
fendant presents no argument that her conviction 
for expired registration should be reversed. Accord-
ingly, we affirm defendant's convictions. 
JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge, and ORME, 
Judge, concur. 
UtahApp.,2001. 
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